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Abstract
Smart home systems utilize network-enabled sensors to collect environmental data and
provide various services to home residents. Such a system must be designed with security
mechanisms to protect the safety and privacy of the residents. More specifically, we need
to secure the production, dissemination, and consumption of smart home data, as well as
prevent any unauthorized access to the services provided by the system. In this work, we
study how to build a secure smart home system in the context of Named Data Networking,
a future Internet architecture that has unique advantages in securing Internet of Things.
We focus on solving two security problems: (a) mutual authentication between a new
device and an existing smart home system to bootstrap the device, and (b) controlling
access to smart home data. We designed a naming hierarchy for a smart home system and
the corresponding trust model. Based on the naming and trust model, we designed
bootstrapping protocols which enforce mutual cryptographic challenges, and a
programming template which facilitates Name-based Access Control. We have designed
and implemented an application that incorporates these solutions. Evaluation result
shows: (a) the bootstrapping protocols can defend against replay attacks with a small
computation overhead, and (b) Name-Based Access Control can provide accurate time
schedules to restrict access to fine-grained data types with a small computation overhead.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Morden smart home applications utilize sensor collected data to provide various
services. Smart climate control uses thermostat and electric meter readings to optimize
home temperature level and energy usage. Intelligent intrusion detection system
distinguishes normal activities and intrusion behaviors based camera recording and Radio
Frequency (RF) readings. Smart home data like the camera recorded images and
thermostat readings are private to the owner of the house. Its production and consumption
must be well secured to ensure smart service operations and protect owner’s privacy. The
current Internet lacks adequate architectural support to build secure smart home systems
composed of thousands of interconnected sensors and Internet of Things devices. In this
work, we study how to create secure smart home systems over Named Data Networking
(NDN), a futuristic Internet architecture which adopts the data-centric approaches. We
focus on securely establishing trust relationships between new devices and the smart home
system (Bootstrapping), and enforce access schedules and policies to authorize the
production and consumption of data (Access Control). Our contributions include 1)
identifying the typical device lifecycles in NDN, 2) designing an organized and expressive
name hierarchy to reflect application meaning and a trust model to facilitate automatic
trust management, 3) designing and implementing a bootstrap protocol to defend against
man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, 4) designing and implementing a smart home
application adopting Name-based Access Control to protect home data production and
consumption, and 5) developing a programming library with code templates to enforce
our designs in application on macOS, Linux and Android platforms.
When a new device is brought to the home, there is no trust relationship between
the device and the smart home system (Figure 2.). The device has little knowledge about
the owner and approved devices, as a result it cannot trust the message received from other
devices. And other devices do not know if the new device is approved by the owner and if
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its data can be trusted. This trust relationship must be bootstrapped when the new device
joins the home and be managed automatically. After the trust bootstrapping, the new
device can publish data that is verifiable by other devices. Bootstrapping trust alone is not
enough to secure the smart home system. And access to smart home data must also be
restricted in a manageable way. This is because only the homeowner owns the devices and
the data they collected or generated. On one hand, it means only the devices approved by
the owner can produce trusted private data. A climate control system should only trust the
temperature readings produced by a trusted thermostat to ensure the correct instructions
are sent to the AC or heater. It is hard to prohibit a device from producing and
broadcasting data, but by designing an Owner-oriented trust model, we can make sure the
unapproved data cannot be trusted in the network. On the other hand, only a device
approved by the owner can consume a type of private data. For example, a smart baby
care system uses camera in the baby’s room to monitor its activities. Only the family
member should be able to watch the baby’s recordings. A visitor should not unless
allowed by the owner. Figure 1. shows the scenario of the examples.
Smart home system relies on a network infrastructure to distribute application data
among devices. It is hard to gain adequate architectural support using the current Internet.
Existing solutions for smart home systems largely adopts IP-based or host-centric
approaches, and are either inefficient or insufficient to support energy friendly smart home
applications [1]. When the Internet was originally designed, computing resources were so
scarce that the primary use of a network was to connect people to time-shared servers. As
such, a core abstraction in the current Internet architecture is a host (a client or a server),
and communication is supposed to happen between end hosts. However, todays Internet
applications are increasingly data-centric. People on social networking sites create
massive amount of content such as video, audio, news, blogs, tweets, and images.
Meanwhile, smart homes also generate a huge amount of data that need to be accessed
on-demand for various purposes such as monitoring and decision making. A data-centric
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Figure 1. Protecting the production and consumption of private data

Figure 2. A new device has no trust relationship with the smart home system
or information-centric architecture like the Named Data Networking (NDN) will support
more efficient and effective smart-home and other IoT applications. NDN makes ”data”
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the primary abstraction of the architecture and it is the most prominient realization of the
Information-Centric Networking paradigm.
The organization of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we briefly introduce the
security threats towards smart home data, the limitations to build secure smart home
applications over the traditional network, and Named Data Networking. Chapter 3
introduces related works to protect data security. Our solutions include Chapter 4 to 6.
Chapter 4 describes the high-level analysis, requirements and design. In Chapter 5, we
design a protocol over NDN to mutually authenticate a new device and the homeowner
and establishing a trust relationship between the two to prepare the device for normal
operations. In Chapter 6, we use Name-based Access Control (NAC) to restrict data
consumption to designated recipients and evaluate the practicality and effectiveness of
NAC. And Chapter 7 summarizes and ends the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1

Existing Smart Home Systems
In recent years, many companies developed programming frameworks to build

secure, energy-efficient and user-friendly smart home applications that connects and
automates home products. For example, Nest Weave[2],ZigBee Home Automation[3],
Samsung SmartThings[4] and Google Thread[5]. They support different underlying
networking protocols and topologies and implements security mechanisms accordingly to
protect the homeowner and the integrity of the smart home. Table 1. compares these
frameworks on the style of networking, trust bootstrapping and access control.
ZigBee Home Automation is an industry standard for smart homes which utilizes
ZigBee meshed network stack[3]. Its built-in security features support bootstrapping a
new device with the device installation code and establishing trust by distributing a
networking key to the device for onboarding. The device can then negotiate
application-layer keys to further enforce integrity and develop access control policies. The
networking is based on an address-based communication model, and security policies are
channel-oriented which focuses on securing the communication channels and the
identities of endpoints. The whole home network shares a single network key to enforce
the perimeter-style security. Once the network key is disclosed [6], all plaintext
communications over the network is exposed. Before the device joins the network, ZigBee
Platform

Networking Style

ZigBee Home

Mesh

SmartThings
Goolge Thread
Nest Weave

Cloud
Mesh, 6LoWPAN
Cloud

Trust Bootstrap

Access Control

Install Code
Left for Application
Network Key
OCF Security
role-based/topic-based
Password + DLTS Left for Application
Pairing Code
OAuth2.0

Table 1. Smart Home Applcation Frameworks
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uses plaintext to exchange the device’s information for device discovery, which also has
security and privacy implications.
Samsung SmartThings is an application framework that eases the development of
smart home applications to connect and automate home appliances. It is built upon
IP-based network (CoAP over UDP) and enforces Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF)
Security Framework to manage trust and provide application-layer privilege separation via
subject-based or role-based access control. The current implementation relies on a cloud
service. Recent research [7] shows it has the over-privilege risk where an application can
easily gain privilege it does not need according to its function description.
Google Thread[5] is a networking protocol which adopts 6LoWPAN [8] to
securely establish decentralized networking between IoT devices and to connect the home
network to the Internet. It uses EC-JPAKE [9], a password-based key
negotiation/agreement protocol to securely establish communication with a new device,
and uses DTLS to onboard the device by establishing a secure communication session. As
a networking layer protocol, it does not provide access control solutions.
Nest Weave is an open communication protocol to develop smart home devices
that can be managed and controlled using Nest services. It powers the Nest devices and
applications. It requires the device to provide a built-in pairing key to bootstrap trust and
establish ownership with the user’s Nest account. The user can grant a device permissions
to access its sensitive data on Nest cloud through OAuth2.0 protocol.
All these protocols and solutions either depend on cloud services which will not
work when there is a disruption in Internet connectivity or does not provide fine-grained
access control to protect data production and consumption.
2.2

Named Data Networking
Smart home applications depend on the underlying networking architecture to

support information flow among devices. Plenty networking standards can be used to
build smart homes. For example, Zigbee, ZWave, Bluetooth, and IPv6 derived protocols
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(such as 6LoWPAN). Despite the differences in connectivity establishment, the
mainstream security mechanism is channel-based security, where data is transmitted over
an encrypted channel from the sender to its recipient. For example, ZigBee uses a shared
network secret-key to secure the network layer broadcasts and application keys for
application sub-layer point-to-point channels. Such security models usually result in
complex security implementations such as the key management and delivery systems in
ZigBee and increase the risk of exposing vulnerabilities to attackers and introduces
computation and storage overheads. The complexity and the vulnerabilities along with it
are amplified when a middlebox such as a proxy or a cache node is envolved in the loop.
An alternative approach to build low-cost, secure and energy efficient applications in
smart homes is needed for the IoT devices. To avoid the limitations in channel-based
security, Named-data Networking (NDN) implements the data-centric security which
coincides with the object-oriented security model [10] and secures the application data
directly instead of the channel in which they are transmitted. The data-centric approach
adopted by NDN also brings other benefits such as the decoupling of producer and
consumer and in-network caching, which is good to develop energy efficient applications
on IoT devices. In this section, we will introduce how NDN works and how trust models
in NDN can help to secure the data.
2.2.1

Interest/Data Exchange and NDN Node Model
NDN enables users and applications to fetch data identified by a given name

directly. Communication in NDN is driven by receivers, i.e., data consumers, through the
exchange of two types of packets: Interest and Data (Figure 3.). A consumer puts the
name of a desired piece of data into an Interest packet and sends it to the network. Routers
use this name to forward the Interest toward the data producer(s). Once the Interest
reaches a node that has the requested data, the node will return a Data packet which
contains a cryptographic signature. This Data packet follows in reverse the path taken by
the Interest to get back to the requesting consumer. When receiving an Interest packet, an
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NDN node (Figure 4.) remembers the interface from which the Interest comes in, forward
the Interest according to the Forwarding Information Base (FIB) maintained according to
a name-based routing protocol, and puts the Interest in the Pending Interest Table (PIT). If
the Interest reaches a node that can serve the data, the nodes send back the Data packet
along the reverse route of the interest, removes the Interest from PIT and cache it in the
Content Store (CS). The name and signature of a Data packet enable packet-level security.
First, the cryptographic signature binds the name and data and removes the need for
channel security or container security. Second, every data is named explicitly, and the
information contained in the hierarchical name provides context for trust management.

Figure 3. NDN Interest and Data Packets

Figure 4. NDN Node Model
For example (Figure 5.), a consumer wants to read the temperature in the bedroom,
it sends out an interest with name “/bedroom/temperature” using a local Face, the local
Face talks with a connected network forwarder (NFD) to forward the interest over NDN
according to a name-based routing protocol. Once the producer receives the Interest
packet, it generates the data and puts back the Data packet to NDN. NDN sends the data
8

back along the path of the Interest and caches the data automatically. Finally, the
consumer gets the data and consumes it.

Figure 5. NDN Example
2.2.2

Naming
Distributing and manipulating named information or data is a major application in

the modern Internet [11]. NDN recommends hierarchically structured names to represent
application data relations and enables scalable routing. For example, the name of a video
produced by the camera in the baby’s room may be
“/local-home/Recording/Tom/sleeping-101.mp4”. The naming conventions, the
application semantics of the names, and the namespace management are opaque to NDN
and left to the application’s responsibility.
Name is the first-class identifier on an NDN network. But it does not always need
to be globally unique. If the application only requires data from a local scope, the name
could be just locally unique. The application must be able to generate the name of the
prefix of the name for a specific piece of data. For example, one can use
“/local-home/Recording/Tom/sleeping-101.mp4” and receive the first piece of the
video with name “/local-home/Recording/Tom/sleeping-101.mp4/1”.
2.2.3

Trust Model
NDN requires every data packet digitally signed. The digital signature coupled

with data publisher information allows a consumer to verify if the data is authentic

9

without caring from where the data is fetched. When the data content is a public key, the
Data packet with its name is effectively a certificate for the key. Then both key
distribution and trust between producers and consumers are simplified. The hierarchical
namespace and data provenance through the binding of name and signature leave flexible
design options for choosing/designing trust models.
An NDN trust model defines which identities act as the trust anchors, and the rules
to determine which identity can be used to prove the authenticity of another one. An
identity is the binding of a namespace and a public key for a specific period. It is
implemented in the form of NDN Certificate and can be used to authenticate data
produced by the real world entity. To prove the identity is authentic and authorized, its
certificate must be signed by a trusted and authorized identity. Trust anchors are
self-signed identities that are trusted by the network by default.
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Chapter 3
Related Works
The need for stronger security assurance in IoT implementations, including Smart
Homes, has been trending. There has been plenty research and design work on this topic
over NDN from various levels and focusing on different scopes.
Trust schemas [12] are sets of rules that automate trust management by matching
content names and key names. By designing and specifying trust schemas, we can
initialize and enforce the trust model throughout the application, which includes
identifying a trust anchor and the trust relationship between identities and keys.
From a high level, the work of [13] discussed how to use NDN to realize the IoT
vision. It identifies the challenges as being designing naming models, bootstrapping trust
and discovering services, managing/schematizing trust, access control and other
application specific requirements. It introduced fundamental ideas of sharing a separate
secret to bootstrap trust, and using name-based access control to authorize data access.
These ideas served as a starting point for our security design for a smart home.
In [14], a gateway-based architecture was introduced to build a secure integrated
home network over NDN. The gateway serves as both a configuration server and the
management center for the network, where trust between new devices and homeowner are
bootstrapped by inputting a pairing code on the gateway node. It requires a synchronized
clock between devices before bootstrapping. It does not provide access control. As it is
published in NDN Technical Reports, we will use the phrase “ndnTR0035” to refer to this
work.
Building management systems share common challenges with smart home
systems, such as sharing sensors data and access controls. The work of [15] describs a
design and implementation to solve these problems by using gateway nodes as proxies
between sensors over IP-based networks and the NDN, and provide access control using
encryptions and access privileges lists (APL).
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NDN-ACE [16] is another access control design tailored for actuator applications
over NDN in constrained environments. It assumes trust bootstrapping is already done and
introduces authorization servers between commanders and actuators to trade speed for
space by delegating key management to authorization servers from actuators.
NDN-Flow [17] is an automated home entertainment application. It focuses on
leveraging NDN to solve two problems in smart IoT systems, namely trust management
and service rendezvous. The former is implemented by specifying trust schemas and the
latter by publishing application metadata under a dedicated sub-namespace.
mHealth [18] focuses on demonstrating how Name-based Access Control (NAC)
can be applied to securely share health data only to designated recipients. In NAC, the
owner generates and distributes separate production and consumption credentials to
producers and consumers over time. A producer generates a content key to encrypt the
data using a symmetric algorithm, encrypts the content key using the production
credentials and publish the encrypted content key. Only designated recipients who hold
the consumption credentials can decrypt the content key to decrypt and consume the
content.
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Chapter 4
Design Overview
Our goal is to design and implement a smart home system which is capable of
bootstrapping new devices and restricting access to data (temperature readings in our
demo) produced by each device for each consumer. This chapter gives an overall
introduction to the assumptions, architectural overview, and intuitions of the design. We
take a top-down approach when analyzing the problem and designing the solution. First,
the assumptions and scopes of the problem must be defined. We list the pre-conditions,
analyze the lifecycle of an IoT device in the smart home, and identify the problems we
need to solve in each phase. Specifically, during the bootstrapping phase, trust must be
securely established between the smart home system and the new device. During the
configuration phase, the owner must be able to restrict data access to each device. The
overall architecture must support multiple devices. Second, the requirements and solutions
for each problem are summarized to serve as an outline of the design. The following
chapters elaborate on detailed designs.
4.1

Assumptions
When an NDN Network Forwarder Daemon (NFD) receives an Interest, it must

know how to forward it according to the Interest packet’s name. The forwarding strategies
and entries of each NFD can be configured manually or automatically. In our design, we
assume there exists a well-known namespace “/local-home”. Each NFD in the local
home knows how to forward packets with this name prefix.
When the manufacturer produces a device, it assigns a universally unique identifier
(UUID) to the device. Each device can share a secret code with the owner out-of-band.
For example, the device body may have a printed barcode, and the owner can learn the
secret code by scanning it. Or the more capable devices can generate and display a code
on demand.
In the smart home system (Figure 6.), multiple IoT devices are providing various
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services. The owner of the home uses a dedicated controller to manage, configure, and
monitor the devices. For example, the controller can an Android phone app. In NDN,
identities are represented in the form of certificates. We assume the owner’s certificate can
be managed and used directly by the controller.

Figure 6. Overview
4.2

Threat Model
We assume an attacker has powerful capabilities to sniff, modify and send NDN

packets, but it cannot break cryptographic primitives (Figure 7. and 8.). For example, it
can launch the man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks by recording, modifying and resending
a packet, but the attacker cannot break the encryption method in use or fake a keyed-hash
message authentication code without knowing the key. We will not discuss side-channel,
OS or hardware specific attacks and consider them out of scope. For bootstrapping, we
consider two kinds of attacks to evaluate the effectiveness of the protocol to defend
against fraudulent bootstrapping attacks. First, an attacker Trudy tries to pretend to be an
authentic device and onboard the home system. She uses recorded bootstrapping
messages to do so. Second, an attacker Trudy tries to pretend to be a controller to trick the
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device into believing it joined an authentic home system. For access control, we consider
an attacker Trudy managed to compromise one device and see if she can gain access to
data not granted.
4.3

Life cycle of a Smart Home Device
A typical lifecycle of an IoT device in a smart home over NDN has 7 phases

(Figure 9.).
Upon power-on, the device performs necessary hardware checks, load the OS and
start running; then it starts network configurations. Upon successfully configuring the
network, the device gains physical connectivity and reachability with other devices on the
same network. It initiates bootstrapping trust with the homeowner to learn the trust anchor
of the home and establish an identity of itself by retrieving a certificate signed by the
owner. It may need a follow-up phase for application specific configurations, then starts
operating normally for daily life. Optionally, the device provides observability for the user
or a supervisor application to monitor its service quality and tweak configurations
accordingly. At last, it should be able to get unloaded from the smart home system for a
reset or decommission.
4.4

Naming Design
We design a hierarchical namespace for a local smart home scope compatible to

schematized trusting to build the trust models later. All names start with a “local-home”
component denoting the local-home scope. The “Key” branch represents the name of the

Figure 7. Attacker in Wireless Environment Figure 8. Attacker in wired Environment
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Figure 9. Lifecycle of a device’s service
owner’s keys. The “bootstrap” branch is for naming data packets used in the
bootstrapping process. The “samples” and “read” branches are required by NAC, where
the former is for naming produced data, and the latter is for naming
production/consumption credentials. Figure 10. shows an example for a smart home with
a remote temperature sensor. Figure 11. list the rules for the naming hierarchy following
semantics in schematized trusting[12].
4.5

Bootstrapping Protocol Requirements and Design
The purpose of bootstrapping protocol is to mutually authenticate the device and

the owner, enable the device to learn the owner’s identity and establish an identity for the
device. Only the authentic device and the real owner can pass the protocol. The bootstrap
process must satisfy the following security requirements:
1. Any critical packet that will trigger a protocol status change must be checked for
integrity and authenticity;
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Figure 10. Overall namespace hierarchy example

Figure 11. Overall name space deisn
2. The protocol should be secure against replay and MitM attacks;
3. The memory, CPU and network overhead must be reasonable to resist resource
exhaustion attacks.
We design the bootstrapping protocol by using secret keys shared out-of-band and
performing mutual cryptographic challenges embedded in two synchronized Interest/Data
message rounds. In each round, the initiator poses a random number as the challenge, and
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the responder must answer by applying a required cryptographic function to the random
number with the shared secret between the device and the owner.
4.6

Access Control Requirements and Design
The purpose of implementing access control is to evaluate the effectiveness of

NAC and provide fine-grained access control in the smart home system. The
implementation must satisfy the following security requirements:
1. An authorized identity must be able to access the content as long as the content is
still valid.
2. An unauthorized identity must not be able to access the content
We apply NAC by designing and implementing helper libraries over NAC
codebase and develop a mini smart home system which enables a user to read remote
temperature data published on a Raspberry Pi on an Android phone and control access to
it via an owner’s app.
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Chapter 5
Bootstrapping Trust
5.1

Introduction
Given the trust model in the NDN context, a new device knows nothing about the

trust anchor and vice versa. The device also does not know under which namespace
should it publish its data, because this information should be configurable according to the
needs of the owner, the higher level application, the specific scenarios, etc. During
bootstrapping, the device needs to learn the trust anchor and its namespace for data
publishment. The trust anchor should learn the device’s public key and generate a
certificate for the device which contains both the device’s public key, namespace, and the
trust anchor’s signature. Upon a successful trust bootstrapping, the device should gain
confidence it joined a trustable smart home environment under the permission of the
homeowner, and its published data will be trusted over the network. Then it may start its
operating process to fetch runtime configurations or begins publishing data. The owner’s
app should gain confidence that the new device is joined by the approval of the user and it
is what it claims to be. Then the owner’s app can update status according, for example,
show the device on a list of all bootstrapped ones. It is vital that during this process each
party can authenticate the other party to make sure the other is present and its message is
authentic. Otherwise, the attacker can trick one side of the two to transfer it trust status
when the other party is not even present, and further trigger the device to perform actions
not wanted by the owner. Take a hypothetical smart voice recorder as an example. The
recorder automatically starts recording when it detects sound in a specific room (such as a
baby’s room). If the attacker tricks the recorder to believe it has bootstrapped successfully,
it may start recording without the owner’s knowledge and use up its storage space slowly.
The trust bootstrap protocol must be able to defend against such kind of attacks. By doing
so, it also decouples the trust establishment from the other lifecycle phases.
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5.2

Trust Bootstrapping in Smart Homes
A homeowner O owns a set of smart devices D in a home. O configures devices

using a controller C. Before working correctly on the network in the house, a new device
Di ∈ D must gain mutual trust with the controller C (which represents the owner O) and
fetch secure and application configurations approved by O for subsequent operations.
After bootstrapping, Di must have learned how to identify and authenticate data generated
by O, and vice versa. In NDN, this means:
• Di learns the certificate of O so that it knows who is the authentic owner of the
home
• Di retrieves a certificate signed O so that it can publish data under the same name
prefix with the newly issued certificate.
Figure 12. shows an example of the trust status before and after bootstrapping.
Before bootstrapping, there is no way for the AC to verify if the data produced by the
thermometer can be trusted or not. After the bootstrapping, the thermostat produces data
under the namespace “/local-home/bdr1/temperature”, and signs the data using its
private key. The AC can verify the authenticity of the data by checking the data signature
against the certificate and gain the confidence of trusting the data.

Figure 12. Before and After bootstrapping
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5.3

Bootstrap Protocol Design
In this section, we present a protocol design that focuses more on the security

goals than communication properties.
To gain trust between two parties without the help of a third one, the two sides
must share some secret knowledge between them and be able to use the secret to verify the
other’s message. In our design, Di shares its unique identifier “<device-id>” and a
secret pairing key K with C out-of-band before bootstrapping. Only Di and C have
access to K. K is securely protected from disclosure before bootstrapping.
5.3.1

Trust model
An NDN trust model defines which identity acts as the trust anchor, and which

identity can be used to prove the authenticity of another one. An identity is the binding of
a namespace and a public key for a specific period. It is implemented in form of
certificates in NDN. An NDN certificate is a data packet. Its name contains the identity’s
namespace, and its contents the public key and other parameters. To prove the claim is
authentic and authorized, the certificate must be signed by a trusted and authorized
identity. We establish a center point trust model in the local home by defining the owner
O’s self-signed certificate Certo as the trust anchor of the network. All other trusted
certificates must be signed by O. This design can be easily extended to schematized
trusting[12], to devise rules defining which identity is authorized to sign certificates for
which namespaces and to automate the distribution and verification of the certificates.
By specifying the trust model, the goal of Bootstrapping becomes 1) mutually
authenticate a device and the trust anchor, 2) let the device retrieve the NDN certificate of
the trust anchor and 3) trust anchor issues an NDN certificate for the device. The NDN
certificate of the trust anchor contains the namespace and public key information of the
trust anchor. The NDN certificate for the device is signed by the trust anchor and defines
the namespace for the device. After this process, the device can verify the authenticity of
other messages over the network, and any consumer of the device’s data can do the same.
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Figure 13. Bootstrapping Protocol Using HMAC
5.3.2

Bootstrap namespace
Before starting the bootstrapping, Di and C must agree on a well known

namespace, for example, “/local-home/bootstrap”, where both of them are reachable.
C and Di publish data under this well-known namespaces for bootstrapping. For example,
C uses “/local-home/bootstrap/owner” , and Di uses
“/local-home/bootstrap/device/<device-id>”. The owner’s name can be learned
from O’s certificate Certo . And the namespace for Di to publish its sensor data can be
learned after the bootstrapping under another well known namespace such as
“/local-home/configuration/namespace/<device-id>”.
5.3.3

Initialize bootstrapping
The device Di initiates the process by sending out an interest

“/local-home/bootstrap/owner/<device-id>/<R0 >/HMAC(<device-id> |
<R0 >, <K>)”. “K” is the shared secret between the device Di and owner’s controller C.
“HMAC” is a keyed-hash message authentication code function. “<R0 >” is a random
number. It serves two purposes. 1) It is part of a cryptographic challenge for the C to
solve later to prove the authenticity of the controller. 2) It differentiates different
bootstrapping interests from the same device with the same key. The network will forward
this interest to C. Upon receiving this interest, C recalculates HMAC to verify 1) if the

22

interest name is altered and 2) if the producer of this interest owns the shared key K. C
only proceeds when the verifications pass.
5.3.4

Learning the trust anchor
Once C verifies Di ’s bootstrapping interest, it sends back the trust anchor’s

self-signed certificate Certo , concatenated with HMAC(Certo — ¡R0 ¿, K. Di verifies the
message by comparing R0 and recalculating the HMAC. If the verification is passed, Di
stores Certo , but does not accept it as the trust anchor at this time.
5.3.5

Learning the device
C sends out an interest

“/local-home/bootstrap/device/<device-id>/<R0 >/<R1 >/HMAC(<device-id>
| <R0 > | <R1 >, K)”. R1 is a random number generated by C. It serves the same
purposes as R0 in Di ’s interest. R0 in this interest identifies which bootstrapping interest
from Di was received and processed by C. Upon receiving and verifying this interest, Di
sends back its public key P ubKeyDi , concatenated with HMAC(P ubKeyDi — R1, K).
Now, Di considers the challenge of R0 is fulfilled by the C, and will accept the Certo as
the trust anchor.
5.3.6

Issuing certificate for the device
C submit P ubKeyDi to the owner, and the owner issues a certificate CertDi by

signing P ubKeyDi using O’s private key. Di fetches its certificate by sending interest
“/local-home/bootstrap/cert/<device-id>”. The certificate is encapsulated as the
payload of the responding data packet. It is named in format
“/local-home/device/<device-id>/<key-id>/KEY/<version>”, binding the
namespace “/local-home/device/<device-id>” with the device’s public key. The
data packet is signed with the C’s key, which is signed by the O. And the device Di can
verify the authenticity of the packet by applying schematized trusting.
This step is required for the device to work. But as our designs simplifies the
process for naming the device, real work application should adapt to requirements to
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negotiate a name for the device before issueing the certificate. On one hand, the device and
the owner has mutually authenticated and learned each other’s public key to authenticate
further messages. On the other hand, though issuing certificate and binding namespaces
are necessary to perform meaningful operations in NDN, it is also customizable to each
application. The namespace to bind to the device could be different and how the owner’s
keys are securely managed is left an open question. One simple solution is letting the C to
store and update the O, making it the only controller in the home. In a sophisticated,
systematic design, the storage of the O should be decoupled with the implementation of C
and should only be accessible to the user who proves itself as an owner.
5.3.7

Design options and reasoning
In this part, we will discuss other design options and the reasons why we didn’t

choose them. First, to initiate the bootstrapping process, we had two options:
1. Di initiates a bootstrapping session by expressing an interest periodically until it
receives a verifiable data published by C.
2. C initiates a bootstrapping session by probing the presence of Di by expressing an
interest periodically.
The two options differ in which principle (C or Di ) will do the polling while waiting for
the other principle to be ready. Hypothetically, C is more likely to be ready and present on
the network than Di . For example, the C is a smartphone app which is always running in
the background or can be launched very fast on demand, and a new device such as a newly
bought thermometer needs to power up and boot before onboarding. When the device
intiates the process, the owner’s app won’t need to know the device information ahead of
time. Because the device can securely embed the information in the first Interest to the
owner. Then owner only needs to input the device’s secret to continue the bootstrapping.
Thus in our design, the device Di sends out the first interest to start the process when it is
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ready, rather than the C polling a namespace until Di is ready. Second, to ensure packet
integrity and authenticity, we can either
1. use an authenticated encryption, such as AES-EAX, AES-OCB[19], etc, on each
packet.
2. use keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC).
We consider two questions. 1) is it necessary to keep confidential the details of the
bootstrapping packets? We use random numbers to defend against replay attacks. Leaving
those numbers in plaintext may expose an attack surface making it vulnerable to table
attacks. We will discuss later in this article that, given benign devices all behaving well,
encryption is not necessary to resist table attacks. 2) what’s the performance and message
overhead? Hash functions are in general faster than encryption and decryption. In the
HMAC design, there are four messages required. In the encryption-based design, there are
6. We prefer using HMAC than encryption, especially for its performance benefits.
However, we also present an encryption-based bootstrapping protocol as a supplement.
Third, to differentiate each packet from the same principle for the same purpose and resist
replay attacks, we could use sequence numbers, timestamps, or random numbers.
Sequence numbers trade extra state management on each principle for the ordinal
property. It introduces more storage overhead if the sequence numbers need to be
remembered across power on and off, and it is easier to record and reply messages with
sequence numbers if they were reset for each bootstrapping. After all, knowing the order
of repeated messages is not necessary, though it helps in deciding which message is the
latest sent or expected one. Timestamps provide not only ordinal property but also a
precise timing of each event. It brings in another dependence on a synchronized clock
between the device and the C. The random numbers require a random number generator
in the system. The correctness and resistance to attacks of the random-number-based
design rely on the implementation quality of the pseudo-random number generator. Many
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platforms come with a built-in pseudo-random number generator, and we consider the
state-of-the-art implementations are good enough for domestic cryptographic use cases.
However, the lack of ordinal information may require extra state management to ensure
correctness in imperfect scenarios, trading performance for robustness.
5.3.8

Encryption-based Bootstrapping Protocol
As a supplement, we now present an encryption-based bootstrapping protocol. The

two protocols both achieve the same security goals. When benign devices’ behavior
cannot be predicted and may misbehave, the encryption-based method is more reliable
than the HMAC based method in defending against replay attacks, especially table attacks.

Figure 14. Bootstrapping Protocol Using encryption
A device shares an identifier D and a secret key K with the homeowner via side
channels. The bootstrapping process is illustrated in Figure 14. and is described as
follows:
1. Homeowner publishes M1 = encr(Po |D|r1 , K), where Po is the owner’s public key,
r1 is a random number, and encr is a symmetric encryption function, under the
name /localhome/bootstrap/device/ownerkey/f or/D;
2. Device fetches M1 , decrypts it, verifies D, and obtains r1 . It then obtains Po and
validates the signature in M1 ;
3. Device publishes M2 = encr(Pd |D|r1 |r2 , K), where Pd is the device’s public key
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and r2 is a different random number, under the name
/localhome/bootstrap/device/D/pubkey;
4. Homeowner fetches and decrypts M2 , then verifies D and r1 , obtains Pd and r2 , and
validates the signature in M2 ;
5. Homeowner publishes M3 = encr(r2 |nonce, K), where nonce is random number,
under the name /localhome/boostrap/device/auth/f or/D;
6. Device fetches M3 , decrypts it, and verifies r2 .
5.4

Evaluation of Trust Bootstrap Protocol
In this section, we evaluate our trust bootstrap protocol regarding performance and

security. Based on the cryptographic tools and parameters used in one scheme, we
estimate the runtime computation overheads introduced by the two design proposal of this
protocol compared to the method proposed in ndnTR0035[14]. Then we give an informal
argument on how the protocol is secure from potential attacks.
5.4.1

Performance Impacts
The major difference between the trust bootstrapping schemes is the cryptographic

tools used to prove the authenticity of the other party. The two schemes introduced in this
chapter use HMAC [20] and AES [21], and are named as homesec-hmac and homesec-aes
respectively. The ndnTR0035 uses HMAC. To measure the computation overheads, we
use the parameters listed in table 2. and simulate for 10000 runs for each scheme. Then
we record the total time cost for each scheme and compute the average computation
overhead in milliseconds.
The results are listed in table 3. Unsurprisingly, the HMAC-based approaches are
more computationally efficient than the AES-based ones. The bootstrapping process
doesn’t frequently happen in daily use, and any less-than-50-milliseconds overhead per
bootstrapping will not cause a performance problem to the smart home system.
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Scheme
Parameter
ndnTR0035-hmac
cipher
ndnTR0035-hmac
keybits
homesec-hmac
cipher
homesec-hmac
keybits
homesec-aes-128
cipher
homesec-aes-128
keybits
homesec-aes-128
cipher
homesec-aes-256
keybits
all
cryptolib
all
CPU Speed
all
Name & Data Size

Value
sha256
128
sha256
128
aes
128
aes
256
openssl
2.20 GHz
≤ 500 bytes

Table 2. Trust Bootstrap Evaluation Parameters

Scheme

Msg Rounds

Runtime Overhead

ndnTR0035
homesec-aes-128
homesec-aes-256
homesec-hmac

1
3
3
2

9.38ms
37.46ms
39.32ms
16.36ms

Table 3. Trust Bootstrap Evaluation Results
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5.4.2

Security Arguments
We consider two kinds of attacks to evaluate the effectiveness of the protocol to

defend against fraudulent bootstrapping attacks.
First, an attacker Trudy tries to pretend to be an authentic device and onboard the
home system (Figure 15.). She uses recorded bootstrapping messages to do so. For the
homesec-hmac scheme, the second interest from the Owner’s controller includes a random
number as a challenge. Only the authentic device can encrypt the random number
correctly. The randomness ensures the attacker can hardly record a correct message for the
same number. Thus the attacker cannot achieve success in her attempt. A similarly
effective protection mechanism can be found in the homesec-aes scheme. The ndnTR0035
uses a timestamp embedded in the Interest name from the device as an implicit challenge
to the device. The implicit assumptions for it to work is 1) an authentic device has a
synchronized clock with the controller, and 2) the communication cost for the interest to
reach the controller is ignorable. In real life scenarios, these two assumptions cannot
always hold. On the one hand, for a low-cost smart home device, it’s hard to ensure the
clock is synchronized securely before it joins the home system. On the other hand, if the
device has a slow network interface card or suffering a slow connection, the timestamp it
sends out may always miss the permitted threshold of the controller and can hardly
bootstrap successfully. The result is high false positives. The ndnTR0035 scheme only

Figure 16. Fake Device Attack

Figure 15. Fake Owner Attack
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works under optimistic scenarios. But the homesec schemes are more reliable under
different situations for such an attack.
Second, an attacker Trudy tries to pretend to be a controller to trick the device into
believing it joined an authentic home system (Figure 16.). In homesec schemes, Trudy
cannot answer correctly the random challenge posed by the device in the first round
interest exchange. Thus her attempt will not achieve success. For ndnTR0035’s scheme,
the timestamp in the Interest name can serve as a challenge and Trudy cannot encrypt or
sign the message including the same timestamp without the correct shared secret between
the device and the owner. In this sense, it is also effective in protecting the device from
trusting a fake home network. However, as we previously mentioned, the device must
have a globally synchronized clock that never resets across power on and offs to ensure an
attacker cannot record already used timestamps and its corresponding replies.
5.4.3

Evaluation Summary
As a summary, all the three schemes can defend against replay attacks effectively.

The homesec schemes are slower than the ndnTR0035 scheme when it comes to both
message overheads or computation overheads acceptably. And they are more reliable in
protecting the owner’s home network and device with fewer assumptions and restrictions.
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Chapter 6
An Application and Evaluation of the Name-based Access Control
6.1

Introduction
Fine-grained access control to smart home data helps to defend against privacy

leaks and user behavior surveillance which would furtherly lead to many severe damages
such as physical intrusion such as burgery [7]. Name-based Access Control is a
content-based access control model [22] which do the work by requiring encrypting the
data upon production and decrypting the data upon consumption. In this section, our goals
are 1) use Name-based Access Control (NAC) in a smart home application to provide
access control to data, and 2) evaluate the usability and effectiveness of the NAC. In the
rest of this section, we will explain the intuition of the NAC design, identify the
difficulties and potential problems needs to be solved to apply the NAC implementation in
a real smart home application, present our design and implementation of the home app,
and show the evaluation metrics and results for NAC.
6.1.1

Intuition of Name-based Access Control
The NAC design models the data production and consumption in three parts: the

producer, the owner, and the consumer. The producer produces data, and the consumer
consumes the data, all under the permission of the owner. The owner controls the
production and consumption permissions by distributing production and consumption
credentials. The production and consumption credentials are pairs of public and private
keys. To give the permit to a data production process, the owner must grant the producer
the production credential. A data producer must generate a content key (C-Key) before
producing a piece of data, and use the key to encrypt the content. It then encrypts the
content key using the production credential. To give access to a piece of data, the owner
distributes the consumption credential to the consumer. The consumer uses the credential
to decrypt the content key and uses the content key to decrypt the data before consuming
the content. Given the actual purpose of the credentials, we call the production credential
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the key encryption key (E-Key) and the consumption one the key decryption key (D-Key).
C-Key, D-Key, and E-Keys are generated over a configurable time interval, and the
problem of securely naming and distributing all the keys are solved by defining a regular
naming scheme and applying schematized trusting over NDN. Figure 17. shows a
high-level view of the relations between each party and keys.

Figure 17. Name-based Access Control
6.2

Applying NAC to smart home applications
The Name-based Access Control (NAC) design provides a fine-grained scheme to

control the access to data over time. On the one hand, it provides a powerful and
expressive API. One can define access schedules for datatypes, and enforce identities to
produce or consume data packets at a schedule. But on the other hand, the implementation
of fine-grained control exposes too many parameters and implementation details to an
application developer, whose major concern is developing functionality instead of digging
into details of how the NAC works under the hood. Additionally, the concept differences
between the NAC API and the NAC design, the lack of the implementation of a higher
level access control manager, the complexity of those API, the inconsistency between API
document and the actual function, the lack of proper exception handling, the
under-maintained status with respect to the NDN primitives implementation (ndn-cxx),
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the implicitly defined API behaviors and uncertain outcomes of the same API calls all
dramatically increases the difficulty to directly apply NAC in an application. To overcome
these difficulties, we analysed the code of NAC implementation (the
name-based-access-control project), suggested documentation and code changes
[23] [24] [25], implemented adapters [26] to properly catch and handle exceptions, and
designed and implemented a higher level access control manager to simplify APIs
exposed for applications and to achieve more explicit and deterministic outputs of
event-driven callbacks.
We identify the problem of applying NAC design as devising time-based schedules
for accesses to data under the same namespace which represents a particular data type and
solve this problem in four steps.
First, NAC defines a set of basic naming rules, and we must incorporate them
when designing the namespace for shared data. Figuire 18. lists NAC naming rules for the
three genres of data. In the figure, “<prefix>” refers to the scoped namespace for the
smart home application. In our application the prefix is “local-home”. “<data-type>”
refers to the sub-namespace of the data that needs to be protected using NAC. For
example, if the data is about the temperature of the owner’s bedroom, its value is
“bedroom/temperature”. “<content-key-identifier>” is a string that is used to
identify the key used to encrypt the content. “<start timestamp>” and “<end
timestamp>” are the start and end of intervals to locate the E-Key and D-Key for data
production and consumption. Figure 19. shows an example of a valid namespace
hierarchy for smart home data.
Second, apply schematized trusting [12] to enforce the same trust model
throughout the smart home system. In our smart home system, the homeowner is the trust
anchor. The owner publishes a self-signed NDN certificate for itself under namespace
“/local-home”. All other nodes in the smart home retrieve this certificate through the
bootstrapping process and accept it as the root of trust. As introduced in previous sections,
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Figure 18. NAC Naming Rules

Figure 19. Smart Home Data Namespace Example
it is necessary for all other data producers in the smart home system to have a data-signing
key signed by the owner’s private key. A data producer signs its data using its key.
Figure 20. shows an example snippet of the signing hierarchy that enforces the trust
model.
Third, design and implement a standard code base for similar application
development. For example, implement the adapters as mentioned earlier and integrated
access manager to smoothe the developing practice, and implementing base classes and
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Figure 20. Signing Hierarchy for the Trust Model
code templates to enforce the same trust model and serialization formats. Figure 21.
shows the design of the code base regarding class diagrams.
Forth, build applications upon the established code base. For demo NAC, our mini
smart home system has four parts: the owner’s app on an Android phone, a thermometer
mounted on a Raspberry Pi, a NAC manager gateway on a laptop, and a temperature
reporter on the owner’s phone. Figure 22. shows the overall relations between each parts.

Figure 21. Class Diagram For the Application Library
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Figure 22. Mini Smart Home System
6.3

Implementing Smart Home Data Access Control using NAC
In this section, we present how we implement the smart home system across x64

and ARMv8 platforms by developing cross-platform libraries and dedicated apps for
macOS, Linux, and Android systems. Our implementation consists of two parts: the
common smart home node API library (Node API)and applications. The Node API
implements functions described in Section 6.2 and encapsulate reusable code templates.
The applications include owner’s controller and data consumer apps on Android, NAC
manager daemon on macOS, and data producers on Raspberry Pi Ubuntu system. The
macOS and Linux implementations relies on ndn-cxx [27] and
lib-name-based-access-controll [28]. The former implements the NDN primitives using
C++, and the latter provides the NAC API. On Android, we use jndn [29], which is one
NDN Common Client Library [30] for Java. Figure 23. shows the hardware settings of
Raspberry Pi and a connected digital thermometer (MCP9808). Figure 24. to Figure 26.
shows the owner’s Android phone, required and implemented apps.
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Figure 23. Mini Smart Home Smart Sensor
6.4

Evaluating NAC
The evaluation of NAC has two parts. First, we estimate the computation and

message overheads in the NAC implementation. The NAC implementation’s code uses
AES128 for content encryption in a hardcoded way. But we also consider the case of
using AES256 as this currently recommended way to perform data encryption on the
Internet of things devices[31]. Second, we analyze the usage scenarios that the NAC
design can cover.
6.4.1

NAC Performance Overheads
By examining the NAC code and observing Interest and Data packet logs via

ndndump [32], we count the additional messages sent and received while performing one
data packet production and one consumption comparing to directly sending an Interest and
receiving a Data packet. We assume the Interest and Data packets are sent for the first time
so that a middle-way NFD couldn’t have cached it and there is no packet resending occurs
in the process. The measurements are done in three parts. First, the group manager doesn’t
actively send out packets. But it publishes 2 data packets as production and consumption
credentials and sends them upon Interests is received. The data producer should request
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Figure 24. Owner’s Phone

Figure 25. Owner’s App

Figure 26. Consumer

production credentials with an Interest. But in the implementation, if the data’s name has
N components, there will be N − 1 interests sent out for requesting the production
credential though only one Data packet is expected to return. This is because the producer
does not know the correct name for the credential and thus it must guess by iterating all
possible names. Then it publishes M encrypted content key packets for M schedules that
has access to the content. The consumer sends one Interest for the consumption credential
and one Interest for the encrypted content key. The total number of packets in transmitting
is 8. The total number of message rounds is 3. Table 4. lists all the count side by side.
For computation overheads, we measure the runtime overheads introduced by
crypto functions. A combination of parameters for each crypto method is a profile. And
for each profile, the estimation is run 1000 times and take the average time cost in
Role

Packets

Message Rounds

Manager
Producr
Consumer

2
4
2

1
1
1

Table 4. NAC Packet and Message Overheads

38

milliseconds as a result. The profile parameters are list in Table 5.. The result is presented
in Figure 27.. As we can see, though the NAC implementation chooses AES 128 over
AES 256, the latter is not introducing more performance impacts than the former. Overall,
the performance impact excluding the communication costs is under 100ms per process
for all profiles.

Figure 27. NAC Computation Overheads - Chart
6.4.2

NAC Security Analysis
In this part, we evaluate how well NAC works for different hypothetical scenarios.
In our mini smart home system, the owner controls the permission for the

thermometer to produce temperature data. To gain permission to produce, the thermostat
must retrieve a certificate from the owner for temperature data’s namespace and fetch
production credentials. If the owner didn’t issue the certificate for the thermometer, then
thermometer’s data won’t be trusted by other nodes. If the owner didn’t publish the
production credential, then the thermostat won’t be able to encrypt the content key, and no
one will be able to read the temperature except for itself. To gain access to read
temperature, the app must retrieve the correct consumption credential from the owner.
Otherwise, the app cannot decrypt the content key, and cannot decrypt the encrypted
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Role

Step

crypto method

parameter

rsa
rsa
urandom
urandom
AES
AES
RSA
RSA
RSA
AES
AES

1024
1024
128
256
128
256
1024
1024
1024
128
256

Manager
credentials key-gen
Manager credentials encryption
Producer
C-Key key-gen
Producer
C-Key key-gen
Producer
Content Encryption
Producer
Content Encryption
Producer
C-Key Encryption
Producer
E-Key Decryption
Consumer
D-Key Decryption
Consumer
C-Key Decryption
Consumer
C-Key Decryption

Table 5. NAC Parameters

Profile

Role

Cmpt. Overhead

rsa-1024-aes-128
rsa-1024-aes-128
rsa-1024-aes-128

manager
producer
consumer
total
manager
producer
consumer
total

54.512419
21.088183
18.893829
94.494431
54.512419
20.869772
19.08343
94.465621

rsa-1024-aes-256
rsa-1024-aes-256
rsa-1024-aes-256

Table 6. NAC Computation Overheads - Data
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temperature reading data. Thus without getting permission, an app cannot finish the
production or consumption of a piece of data by enforcing NAC.
When the owner revokes the permission for a producer to publish data, it stops
offering the producer the production credentials. The producer won’t be able to continue
production when its current production credential expires. When the owner revokes the
permission for a consumer to read data, it stops offering the consumer the consumption
credentials. This works for future data when the current consumption credentials expire.
However, this won’t prevent the consumer from decrypting and reading the previous data
before the revocation because the consumer may still have access to keys before the
revocation. The NAC authors suggested one way to do the renovation work by requiring
the app to encapsulate the consumption process in a black box, and all the keys are
forgotten upon usage. However, this solution is not strong enough to protect the user’s
data. To entirely revoke the read access from the app, the app must not remember any
previous keys, the network must not have caches of earlier keys, and the owner stops
publishing then app’s consumption credentials.Even so, if a device is compromised, it
won’t behave as good as defined by the protocol and there is no way to restrict it. The
same issue exists for the producer. A producer app is compromised and is publishing
wrong data. The owner revoked its write permission by stopping publishing certificate and
the production credential. The compromised producer may use the previous keys to
produce and sign the data and cheat the consumer to use an erroneous or adversary history
data.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this work, we studied current smart home technologies and identified security
risks in producing and accessing smart home data. We designed and implemented
protocols in the context of NDN to protect the home owner’s data by securing the
bootstrapping of new devices and enforcing fine-grained access control. We include a
mutual authentication process in the bootstrapping protocol to eliminate the strong
assumptions made in previous work and enhance the defense against replay attacks. We
developed an access control manager with a friendly API to enforce name-based
fine-granularity access control to smart home data. Our evaluation shows that NAC does
not introduce significant computation overhead and performs well in granting and
preventing accesses. Last but not the least, we provide a Smart Home Common Node API
incorporating the trust bootstrapping and access control protocols for building future
smart home applications over NDN across macOS, Linux and Android platforms.
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